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This Article maps the transformation of constitutional understandings of the 
forms of aggregation that due process permits by putting these expanding views into 
the context of the changes in the federal docket during the past half century. In the 
1940s, jurists interpreting the representative action provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act thought individuals who had not personally agreed to be part of those 
cases could not be bound by the results. In the 1950s, however, the Supreme Court 
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approved aggregation to serve the “vital state interest” in protecting banks from large 
numbers of claims when trust accounts were pooled. And in 1966, Rule 23 created a 
broader mechanism to bind absentees without their affirmative consent or their 
participation at the inception of a lawsuit. Through analyzing unpublished memos by 
Rule 23 drafters, I show how remarkably successful they were in displacing once 
conventional constitutional wisdom by disentangling autonomy, consent, and 
individualization in litigation from the strictures of the Due Process Clause. 
One marker of change comes from data on the related aggregate form of multi-
district litigation, which in 2015 accounted for almost forty percent of the federal courts’ 
docket of pending civil cases. Other data mark the need for aggregation: twenty-five 
percent of the civil filings in federal court, and fifty percent of the appeals, are by litigants 
without lawyers. Aggregation provides infusions of resources that are central to enabling 
litigation, and hence aggregation continues to serve the “vital interest” of the 
government—in need of legitimate court systems to which diverse users have access. 
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I. CONSTITUTIONALIZING AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
Narratives of class actions identify the 1966 reforms of Rule 23 as liberating 
aggregation. But the key decision enabling today’s aggregates dates from the 
early 1950s when the Supreme Court, in service of protecting what it saw to be 
a “vital state interest,” relaxed the strictures of the Due Process Clause to enable 
banks to preclude subsequent claims by beneficiaries of pooled trusts. In the 
1960s, rule drafters built on that model to deploy federal courts to do other 
kinds of work, including facilitating lawsuits for groups of civil rights plaintiffs 
and consumers who could not have pursued cases individually. 
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This Article maps the transformation of constitutional understandings of 
what due process permits by putting these expanding views into the context of 
the changes in the federal docket during the past half century. In the 1940s, 
jurists interpreting the representative action provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act thought individuals who had not personally agreed to be part of 
those cases could not be bound by the results. A key shift occurred in 1950 when 
the Supreme Court approved binding beneficiaries to protect banks pooling 
trust funds.11 But Rule 23 went further and created a broader mechanism to 
bind absentees without their affirmative consent or their participation at the 
inception of a lawsuit. Through analyzing unpublished memos by Rule 23 
drafters, I show how remarkably successful they were in displacing once 
conventional constitutional wisdom by disentangling autonomy, consent, and 
individualization in litigation from the strictures of the Due Process Clause. 
Not only did Rule 23 embed expansive readings of due process that had 
been thought a few decades earlier to be impossible, Rule 23 so deeply 
normalized aggregate processing that it became commonplace for the very 
cases—mass torts—presumptively exempt in the 1960s. One marker of that 
change comes from 2015, when the related aggregate form of multi-district 
litigation (MDL) accounted for almost forty percent of the federal courts’ 
docket of pending civil cases, and product liability cases were ninety-two 
percent of the individual actions clustered within the MDL docket. 
The rise of aggregation intersects with other shifts in courts, as judicial 
promotion of settlement along with other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution came to the fore. Most of these managerial and settlement efforts 
take place outside public courtrooms. The mix of cases has also changed and, 
during the last decade, the number of unrepresented litigants has swelled. 
Individuals without lawyers file a quarter of the civil cases annually brought to 
the federal courts. 
In the 1990s, conflicts over the propriety of class actions gained intensity. 
Congress banned legal service lawyers from bringing class actions and 
constrained the use of prison and securities class actions. In 2011, the Supreme 
Court licensed a broad evisceration by interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) to permit job applications and consumer forms to ban aggregation. 
The preclusion of class actions through the FAA and the prevalence of 
aggregation share a conceptual predicate: legally-constructed, rather than 
actual, consent. The individuals affected are not the authors of the terms under 
which their rights are decided. Yet the reasons for doing so diverge. Class action 
bans impose costs on the pursuit of rights by cutting off access to courts and  
 
1 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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suppressing information relevant to other potential claimants. Class actions 
and MDL proceedings aim to enable access to remedies through group-based 
redress in a public forum. 
During the past fifty years, discussions of aggregation have been laced by 
two motifs: utility and hostility. In 2017, Congress launched yet another 
attempt to derail class actions as well as to limit tort-based MDLs. But criticism 
of aggregation ought not distract its proponents from considering how to 
respond to the experiences over the decades with aggregate practices. The 
legitimacy of court-based judgments has been keyed either to direct 
participation or adequate representation of absentees’ interests. Since its 
inception, discussions of Rule 23 have focused on the similarities and the 
differences across claimants at two points—certification of classes and 
approvals of settlements. 
“Vital” state interests need again to be brought into focus to require making 
patent—rather than opaque—decisions to shape distribution systems under the 
rubric of class actions and MDLs, so as to bring into focus the challenges, after 
settlements are crafted, of responding to diverse interests. Putting those issues 
under the court’s aegis and before the public’s eye can shift (again) 
constitutional understandings of what courts can and should do. 
II. COLLECTIVELY DEPENDENT 
Five facts about the docket and doctrine of the federal courts inform my 
reflections on the fiftieth anniversary of the modern class action. Filings have 
flattened; significant proportions of pending cases are aggregated through 
multidistrict litigation; large numbers of unrepresented litigants file cases; 
doctrines have constricted the availability of class actions; and almost no trials, as 
well as much else, take place in public proceedings in the federal judicial system. 
First, filings in the federal court system, which had more than doubled 
between 1970 and 1985, have experienced little growth in the last three decades. 
The details are in Figure 1, a graph of federal district court filings between 1970 
and 2015.2 
 
2  The data in Figure 1, U.S. District Court Filings, 1970–2015, were derived from William F. 
Shughart II & Gokhan R. Karahan, Determinants of Case Growth in Federal District Courts in the United 
States, 1904–2002 (ICPSR 3987), INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3987 [https://perma.cc/TE9Z-E42E]. Civil 
caseload data for 1998-2015 were derived from Caseloads: Civil Cases, U.S. a Party, 1870-2016, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-civil-cases.u.s.-party-1870-2016 
[https://perma.cc/MG8U-FHWB]. Criminal caseload data for 1998–2015 were derived from 
Caseloads: Criminal Cases, U.S. a Party, 1870–2016, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/courts/caseloads-criminal-cases-1870-2016 [https://perma.cc/M476-8GGM]. Criminal and 
civil caseload data for 2001–2015 (for the twelve-month period ending Mar. 31) were adapted from 
yearly reports created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
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Figure 1: U.S. District Court Filings, 1970–2015 
During the past fifteen years, civil and criminal filings have held steady, 
ranging from between 300,000 and 360,000 cases per year. In 2015, 279,036 civil 
cases were filed, and the federal government brought more than 60,000 criminal 
cases,3 a significant proportion of which involved multiple defendants.4 
In contrast to flattened filings, the number of pending civil cases, tracked in 
Figure 2, more than tripled between 1970 and 2015. As of 2015, 341,813 cases 
were pending. But thousands of these cases are not dealt with individually. 
Rather, a second key fact about the federal courts is that, in addition to an 
unknown number of cases certified as class actions,5 tens of thousands of cases  
 
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics [https://perma.cc/WJ68-WK3M] (navigate 
to “Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics” hyperlink for each respective year, then “C series” tables for 
civil data and follow “download” hyperlink); id. at tbl.D (navigate to “Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics” hyperlink for each respective year, then “D series” tables for criminal data and follow 
“download” hyperlink). 
3 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbls.C&D, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/WJ68-WK3M] (navigate to “Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2015” hyperlink, then 
“D series” table for criminal data and “C series” for civil data and follow “download” hyperlink). 
4 Aggregation rather than individualization is also a phenomenon found in criminal 
prosecutions. In 2015, the U.S. government commenced prosecutions against 80,069 defendants; 
given 60,000 cases, almost a quarter of all defendants were prosecuted in a multi-defendant case. 
U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Commenced, Terminated, and Pending (Including Transfers), 
During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2015, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/d01dmar15_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AFS-9T3Z]. 
5 While MDL data are collected and made available by the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, obtaining parallel data on the use of class actions over the years is difficult, as is identifying 
proposed class actions. See Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know 
You Better After All This Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 616-23 (2017); EMERY G. LEE, III & 
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are clustered together under the 1968 “multidistrict litigation” (MDL) statute.6 
Based on findings by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) that 
the statutory criteria for pre-trial aggregation are met (“civil actions involving 
one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in different districts”),7 the 
Panel transfers the cases to a single judge. The result is an uneven pattern of 
assignments around the United States, given that, as of the fall of 2015, almost 
forty percent of pending federal civil cases were part of MDLs.8 
 
Figure 2: Civil Cases Pending in Federal District Courts, 1972–20159 
 
 
 
THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE 
FEDERAL COURTS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (Apr. 2008). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
7  Id. § 1407(a). 
8 Specifically, 132,788 cases out of 341,813 pending cases were in MDLs. See U.S. JUDICIAL 
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015 7, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical_
Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BDY-W9SJ] (data are from 
the year ending September 30). 
9 The data on pending civil cases come from Table C of each annual Report of the Proceedings 
of the Judicial Conference of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States 
Courts. In some years, the data were revised in a subsequent publication, and in such instances, we 
have used revised numbers. For example,  for Fiscal Year 1991, the number cited (226,234 pending 
cases) comes from the  1992 report, rather than the number of 240,599 pending cases published in 
the 1991 report. For the data for 1998 to 2015, see Caseload Statistics Data Tables, ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables 
[httpss:/perma.cc/WTM8-YLTU] (navigate to “search by table number,” search by table number “C-
6” then follow hyperlink for each corresponding year). Data for each year between 1968 and 1990 
are for the year ending  June 30; data for each year between 1991 and 2015 are for the year ending  
September 30. 
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The growth in the aegis of MDL is significant, as is charted in Figure 3, 
focused on the numbers of cases consolidated through MDLs, and in Figure 4, 
comparing the numbers of pending federal civil cases to those within MDLs.10 
 
Figures 3: Percentage of the Pending Federal Civil Docket in  
Multidistrict Litigation, 1972–2015 
 
 
 
 
 
10 The method for data collection used in Figure 2 was also used for Figure 3, Percentage of 
the Pending Federal Civil Docket in Multidistrict Litigation, 1972–2015, and for Figure 4, Pending 
Multidistrict Litigation Compared to Pending Civil Cases in Federal District Courts, 1972–2015. See 
supra note 9. MDL data for 1972–1979 are from the “Legacy Statistics 1968–1979” Report from the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, 
LEGACY STATISTICS 1968–1979, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Legacy_Statistical_
Reports-1968-1979-Compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3HD-CT85]. MDL data for 1980–1991 are 
from the “Legacy Statistics 1980–1991” Report. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION, LEGACY STATISTICS 1980–1991, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/
Legacy_Statistical_Reports-1980-1991-Compressed_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR39-XK9J]. The 
remaining MDL data (for 1992–2015) are from the respective annual reports of the United States 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, 
STATISTICAL INFORMATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info [https://perma.cc/
U78V-VPPR] (navigate to “Fiscal Year” hyperlink under Statistics File for each respective year). 
Note that data for each year from 1972 to 1991 were collected ending June 30; data for each year from 
1992 to 2015 used the ending date of September 30. 
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Figure 4: Pending Multidistrict Litigation Compared to Pending  
Civil Cases in Federal District Courts, 1972–2015 
In 1991, fewer than 2232 cases (or about one percent of the civil docket) 
were part of MDL proceedings.11 By September 2015, of 341,813 federal civil 
cases pending,12 132,788 were concentrated in 247 proceedings aggregated 
before a single judge.13 In 2015, some 150 judges were assigned one MDL, 
 
11 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, LEGACY STATISTICAL REPORTS 
1980–1991 445, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Legacy_Statistical_Reports-1980-1991-
Compressed_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M89H-RCAC]. Data are from year ending on June 30. 
12  See U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period 
Ending September 30, 2015, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.C-1 (Sept. 30, 
2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C01Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RB2-
DGN6]. The pending cases use the end date of September 30, while the MDL reports use the fifteenth 
of each month. 
13 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/
files/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A66M-BWCE]. The FY 2015 Report stated that 307 MDLs were extant but also that 60 MDLs had 
terminated, and hence we put the number of pending MDLs at 247. Id. at 15, 27, 33-35. 
A few MDLs have played a disproportionate role in contributing both to the federal docket and 
to the number in MDL. For example, if asbestos (numbering 856 pending cases) and vaginal mesh 
litigation were removed from both the numbers of MDL cases and the federal civil docket in the 
2015 data, the number of pending federal civil cases would be 267,877 and the number of pending 
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twenty-eight had two MDLs each, and ten had three or more, some of which 
involved different manufacturers of a product alleged to be harmful.14 
The third structural fact is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, charting the 
filings by litigants who are not represented. Lawyers are absent in a 
significant portion of the federal civil docket. 
 
Figure 5: Filings by Unrepresented Litigants in the 
U.S. District Courts, 2004–201515 
 
 
 
 
cases in an MDL would be 58,852. Thus, the percentage of the federal pending cases in the fall of 
2015 under the MDL rubric would have been twenty-two percent, rather than almost forty percent. 
14 To calculate the number of MDLs per judge, we relied on the “Summary By Docket of 
Multidistrict Litigation Pending as of September 30, 2015, Or Closed Since October 1, 2014” in U.S. 
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical_
Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A66M-BWCE]. The 
prestige generated by being assigned an MDL is detailed in Abbe Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: 
Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV 
1669 (2017). 
15 The data for Figure 5, Filings by Unrepresented Litigants in the U.S. District Courts, 2004-
2015, were derived from the respective yearly reports from the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-
states-courts [https://perma.cc/98AT-4BVS] (navigate to “Judicial Business” hyperlink for each 
respective year, then “Judicial Business Tables” for each year’s tables and follow “download” 
hyperlink for Publication Table No. C-13). Note that the collection relies on ending the years on 
September 30. 
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Figure 6: Filings by Unrepresented Litigants 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1995–201516 
 
As the graphs illustrate, by 2015, more than twenty-five percent of the 
plaintiffs filing civil cases in federal courts did so without counsel at the trial 
level,17 and on appeal more than fifty percent of litigants did.18 Disaggregated 
 
16 The data for Figure 6, Filings by Unrepresented Litigants in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 
1995-2015, for 1995–96 were derived from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 48, 125-27 (1996). Data 
for 1997–2015 were derived from the respective yearly reports from the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts. See supra note 9. 
17  The Administrative Office, using the term “pro se,” has reported data on unrepresented 
litigant filings at the trial level since 2004. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-13 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/data_tables/C13Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM39-NKPP]. Specifically, 73,745 of 
the 279,036 civil filings (26.4%) were filed by unrepresented litigants; the percentage of filings by 
unrepresented civil litigants was about one quarter of the filings from 2010 to 2015. Id. 
18  See, e.g., U.S. Courts of Appeals—Pro Se Cases Filed, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.2.4 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/table_2.04_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR4P-YKV2]. Since 2010, the percentages of 
unrepresented filers have been about fifty percent. See, e.g., U.S. Courts of Appeals—Pro Se Appeals 
Commenced and Terminated, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2015, ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.B-9 
(2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/B09Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZJ6-
92NN] (reporting 24,247 civil pro se cases of 41,318 total pro se cases filed—58.7%). To review the same 
table (B-9) for each year from 2010–15, see Caseload Statistics Data Tables, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables?tn=B-9&pn=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%
5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D [https://perma.cc/SBW3-HGHD] (navigate to “Search by table 
number,” search by table number “B-9” then follow hyperlink for each year). 
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by circuits, the range ran from about a third to sixty-four percent of the 
filings.19 These numbers included both thousands of prisoner filings and 
many cases brought by people who were not incarcerated.20 
Fourth, the use of class actions has been limited by statutes, by Supreme 
Court interpretations of Rule 23, and by the Court’s reading of the 1925 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).21 Constraints on class actions date back to the 
1970s when, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court insisted that 
under the then-recently-amended Rule 23, plaintiffs provide and pay for 
notice to individual class members.22 That requirement priced some lawyers 
out of the class action market. 
Major inroads into class action practice came in 1996, when Congress 
deprived the neediest litigants of ready access to class actions. Altering rules 
governing the Legal Services Corporation, Congress banned recipients of 
LSC funds from bringing class actions.23 In the same year, Congress enacted 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which limited access to relief for 
prisoners and imposed new costs on prison-conditions class actions.24 
Congress provided that defendants and interveners could move to terminate 
 
19 The range was thirty-three percent in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to 
sixty-four percent in the Fourth Circuit. See U.S. Courts of Appeals—Pro Se Cases Commenced and 
Terminated, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2015, 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL tbl.B-9 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics/table/b-9/judicial-business/2015/9/30 [https;//perma.cc/CU7Y-ZBX9]. 
20  The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) categories for which pro se filers are 
recorded were “Criminal, U.S. Prisoner Petitions, Other U.S. Civil, Private Prisoner Petitions, 
Other Private Civil, Bankruptcy, Administrative Agency Appeals, Original Proceedings and 
Miscellaneous Applications.” In 2014 and 2015, non-prisoners filed 24,274 and 25,117 cases pro se, 
respectively. Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period Ending 
September 30, 2014, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/
C13Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR5S-TWX4]; see tbl.B-9, supra note 18 (reporting 2015 data). On 
appeal, non-prisoner, non-criminal cases were forty-four percent of all pro se cases tallied. U.S. Court 
of Appeals—Pro Se Cases Commenced and Terminated, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding, During the 12-
Month Period Ending September 30, 2015, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
B09Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M2D-GMS7]. 
In 1995, about forty percent of the 50,000 appeals were pro se. In 2014, fifty-one percent of the 
55,000 appeals were filed by individuals without lawyers. Thus, more than 28,000 appeals were 
lawyerless on at least one side, and about 12,000 of those appellants were not prisoners. Because 
filings categorized as prison petitions were about 13,000–14,000 in both 1995 and in 2014, the rise in 
filings by unrepresented individuals cannot be attributed solely to prisoner petitions. 
21 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925)). 
22 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974). 
23 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
§ 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53; see also generally Judith Resnik & Emily Bazelon, Legal Services: Then 
and Now, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 292 (1998). 
24 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.). 
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injunctive relief (including longstanding consent decrees).25 Congress further 
limited the fees that lawyers for prisoners could be paid.26 
Congress also enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA), creating a more restrictive format for those class actions.27 
Before seeking class certification, plaintiffs had to publish in “a widely 
circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service, a notice 
advising members of the purported plaintiff class,” and had to seek 
appointment as a lead plaintiff.28 Congress thereby slowed down certification 
and required judges to announce which clients and lawyers would gain 
leadership status as the “most adequate plaintiff.”29 In 2005, class actions took 
another hit, this time through the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which 
enabled federal courts to take jurisdiction over certain large-scale class actions 
filed in state courts under state law.30 The operative assumption of CAFA’s 
proponents was that once federal judges had such cases, they would decline 
to certify some of the cases as class actions.31 
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has been at the forefront of curbing 
class actions,32 in part through interpretations of Rule 23.33 Yet the decisions are 
variegated, in that constrictions of Rule 23 depend on the underlying substantive 
rights and on the stage of the litigation.34 Moreover, class-based claims remain 
vital in arenas from high-profile monetary settlements such as the Volkswagen 
emissions litigation35 and the BP oil spill36 to lawsuits brought about general 
prison conditions and solitary confinement.37 
 
25 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (2012). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012). 
27 Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) & (B)(i) (2012). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
30 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
31 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: 
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1448-49 (2008); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism 
from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of 
Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1934 (2008). 
32 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013); Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2541, 2556-57 (2011). 
33 See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013). 
34 See Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-“Trans-Substantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1625 (2017); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions: A Court Divided, 8 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. 
CT. CASES 291, 291 (2016). 
35 See Settlement Agreement, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (No. 3:15-md-02672). 
36 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the 
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014). 
37 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011); Stipulation, Parsons v. Ryan, No. 12-00601 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 14, 2014); Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Gov. of Cal., No. C 09-05796 CW (N.D. Cal. 
Sept 1)(ECF No. 424-2). Aggregation also comes through Department of Justice litigation under 
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, and gathering of aggregate data about prison 
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The Court’s other major mechanism for limiting class actions comes from 
its recent reading of the 1925 FAA to condone class action bans, inserted into 
a variety of forms provided to consumers and prospective employees.38 By 
licensing providers to insist on single-file processing, the Court has cut off 
the infusion of resources which aggregation provides across an array of federal 
statutory, as well as state and common law, claims. 
The fifth key fact about the federal courts is that almost no cases reach 
trial. As of 2015, about one in 100 civil lawsuits filed began a trial before either 
a judge or a jury.39 Which cases make it to trial is not readily knowable; my 
preliminary review of available data on the roughly 3000 cases tried in 2015 
permits only a window into aspects such as whether litigants were 
unrepresented, whether in classes or MDLs, the subject matter, and where 
the cases were filed across the United States.40 
Of course, judges do a good deal of adjudication without trials. 
Assessments of judges’ time spent in open court (“bench presence”), based 
on statistics from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO), reflect 
 
conditions is used both administratively and litigiously to drive reform. See, e.g., Time-In-Cell: The 
ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative Segregation in Prison, LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE L. 
SCH., & ASS’N ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMINS. (Aug. 2015), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/
documents/pdf/asca-liman_administrative_segregation_report_sep_2_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N53P-AT4J]. 
38 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)); see also generally Judith Resnik, 
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers]; Judith Resnik, Diffusing 
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 
YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]. 
39 This figure is frequently cited and based on data gathered by the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts annual reports. See, e.g., U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit 
and Action Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2015, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (2015), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c04jun15_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/96QP-QL2L]. 
40 See Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base 2014: Codebook for Civil Terminations Data with 
Docket Numbers, PLT and DEF Blanked, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36110 [https://perma.cc/LST9-MVHV] [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, Civil Codebook]. 
The dataset tracks 4.6 million civil cases brought between 1996 and 2015. Within this dataset, 
we focused on fiscal year 2015 and counted 69,200 cases commencing a jury or bench trial by picking 
cases with values 6, 7, 8, 9 in the “PROCPROG” column. See id. at 21 (explaining the “PROCPROG” 
field). The information reported comes from court clerks, who use civil cover sheets and other materials 
prepared by lawyers and complete forms (JS5 and JS6) transmitted at least quarterly to the AO. No 
independent methods of verifying uniformity or accuracy were undertaken centrally. 
Through this analysis, in FY 2015 (between 10/1/2014 and 9/31/2015), we identified about 1.5 
percent of cases (2976) which proceeded to trial, albeit not all ending in verdicts, as some were 
settled after a trial had begun. Thanks are due to Emery Lee for advance access to what became 
available as of Spring 2017 on an updated www.fjc.gov website and to Jonah Gelbach for directing 
us to this resource and related data. The FJC data are now available at Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, 
and Pending from SY 1988, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/civil-cases-filed-
terminated-and-pending-sy-1988-present [https://perma.cc/6UTH-3HLF]. 
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a “steady year-over-year decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 
2012.41 The result was that, in 2012, judges spent “less than two hours . . . per 
day” in the courtroom, or about “423 hours of open court proceedings per 
active district judge.”42 While judges may be interacting with litigants and 
lawyers through forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), those 
exchanges are outside the public realm.43 
These five structural facts are all about the relationship of “class,” in 
different senses of that word, to courts as state-provided services. Around 
the world, commentators describe judiciaries navigating this “age of 
austerity.”44 In the United States, state courts are identified as the center of 
struggles, given their own lack of financial wherewithal and legions of 
unrepresented individuals. Tallies from California and New York detail 
millions of civil litigants proceeding without lawyers.45 The challenges 
facing the federal courts also need to be brought into view, as twenty-five 
percent of trial-level filings and fifty percent of appellate filings in the 
federal courts come from unrepresented parties. Even though the federal 
courts are comparatively well-financed, a significant proportion of their 
litigants are not. 
Turning from “class” in the sense of the economic capacity of individuals 
and judicial systems to “class” as a form of litigation, looking at the federal 
docket underscores that aggregation is a dominant procedural form. As 
noted, the AO does not provide comprehensive data on class actions but it 
does track MDLs—enabling us to know that almost forty percent of the civil 
cases proceed in clusters of various sizes. That percentage requires revising 
classic discussions of class actions, which have focused on the utility for 
individuals with neither the resources nor knowledge to litigate single-file.46 
 
41 Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal 
District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565 (2014). 
42 Id. at 566. 
43 See generally Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences 
and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631 (2015). 
44 See, e.g., Xandra E. Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, Relief in Small and Simple Matters in an Age of 
Austerity, in XVTH INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW WORLD CONGRESS 221-
24 (H. Pekcanitez, N. Bolayir & C. Simil eds. 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2610773 [https://perma.cc/6FKT-FHJ4]. I discuss the ways in which government subsidies of 
courts and their users put justice systems in the category of social and economic rights in Judith 
Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social Rights, in THE FUTURE 
OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (Katharine G. Young ed., forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2983853 [https://perma.cc/73HQ-MC2N]. 
45 See, e.g., Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68650 (2012); Jonathan 
Lippman, Chief Judge of the State of New York, The State of the Judiciary 2015: Access to Justice: 
Making the Ideal a Reality, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED SYS. 19 (Feb. 17, 2015). 
46 See generally Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941). 
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Class actions provide economies of scale for defendants and for judges by 
limiting repetitive work and inconsistent decisionmaking and by holding 
out promises of a “comprehensive resolution” if not “global peace.”47 
What my analysis of the federal courts reflects is that judges also need 
aggregation to ensure that some cases are staffed by lawyers with resources 
to clarify the claims advanced. Thus, an irony of the class action “wars”48 is 
that the federal judiciary should be included in an accounting of those 
“injured” by such assaults, including the effort to undercut class and tort-
based MDLs launched in Congress in 2017.49 
Pointing to the utility of aggregate litigation for governing authorities 
has a long history, dating back to Medieval Europe.50 This fiftieth year 
celebration of the 1966 revisions of Rule 23 may obscure that its central 
element—binding absentees who have not participated and functionally are 
without realistic opportunities to litigate individually—was enshrined in 
U.S. law more than a decade earlier.51 The foundational re-conception of 
the Due Process Clause came in 1950 in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Company when the U.S. Supreme Court approved aspects of New 
York’s banking laws that enabled fiduciaries to obtain judicial clearance, in 
the aggregate, of potential claims from beneficiaries of pooled trusts.52 Not 
only did the Court license binding individuals whose “whereabouts could 
not with due diligence be ascertained,”53 the Court revised its jurisdictional 
rules to permit a state to close off the rights of individuals from other states. 
Moreover, the Court structured notice requirements to avoid making them 
too costly. As Justice Jackson explained, 
the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a 
final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of individuals who 
are outside of the State can somehow be determined. A construction of the 
 
47 Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1944 
(2017). In contrast, some argue that class litigation subjects government defendants to undue judicial 
oversight and corporate defendants to “bet[ting] the company,” as Justice Scalia put it for the Court 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). 
48 Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class 
Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979). 
49 See Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
50 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION (1987). 
51 See generally John Leubsdorf, Unmasking Mullane: Due Process, Common Trust Funds, and the 
Class Action Wars, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1693, 1728 (2015). 
52 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
53 Id. at 317. 
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Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in 
the way could not be justified.54 
In the 1960s, new vital state interests—facilitating filings by civil rights 
and small consumer claimants—came to the fore. Aggregate litigation was 
then enlisted through revisions of Rule 23 to move due process parameters 
again. As I write in 2017, efforts to dislodge aggregation—in the name of state 
interests in unfettering the authority of both the public and private sectors—
have taken center stage. My argument, in contrast, is that the facts about the 
federal docket make plain that aggregation continues to have important 
contributions to make. But what fifty years of working under the 1966 
template has taught is that the arc of litigation extends beyond settlement. 
States should be vitally concerned with bringing the challenges of interest 
representation, arising during the implementation phase of remedies, under 
the courts’ aegis and before the public’s eye. 
To explain the history and the present problems, I first sketch the 
developing “class-consciousness” in the twentieth century, as judges and 
legislators devised methods to welcome new sets of litigants through a mix of 
substantive legal entitlements and procedural endowments, including the 
subsidies provided by collective actions. To clarify the conceptual constitutional 
leap that the 1950 decision of Mullane entailed and that Rule 23 consolidated, I 
begin with the categorization of class actions outlined in the 1938 version of 
Rule 23 and with the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),55 which seemed 
to provide a radically capacious invitation for representative litigation. 
But federal judges insisted that the FLSA’s authorization for employees to 
file on behalf of “other employees similarly situated”56 could not, 
constitutionally, permit lawsuits to proceed without record evidence of 
individuals’ personal consent.57 The 1940s FLSA case law’s loyalty to individual 
participation rather than to interest representation underscores the distance 
traveled in constitutional interpretation, a move that is now generally taken for 
granted:58 the binding through class actions of absentees who have not 
affirmatively consented to be represented.59 
 
54 Id. at 313-14. Justice Burton dissented, arguing that states had discretion to decide whether 
they had to “supplement the notice” to beneficiaries. Id. at 320 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
55 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19) [hereinafter 1938 FLSA]. 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. Iowa 1946); discussion infra 
Section III.A. 
58 But see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 5-15 (2009). 
59 The Supreme Court has required opportunities to opt out for absent class action plaintiffs 
in cases seeking monetary relief. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). 
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The next part of this Article is devoted to Mullane’s 1950 rereading of the 
Due Process Clause, the purposefulness of the 1966 Rule 23 revisions, and 
aggregation’s expansion through the creation of the MDL transfer system of 
cases across federal district courts. The 1966 Rule did on a grand scale what 
the judges reading the FLSA thought was impermissible—deciding the rights 
of absentees without their affirmative consent.60 But even with impressive 
ambitions, the drafters of Rule 23 focused on arenas in which they thought 
the need for lawyers most pressing. The 1960s Advisory Committee 
presumed that mass torts did not fit their class action paradigm because tort 
claims were thought to be individualized in a way other cases were not and 
resourced through contingency fees.61 
Yet, as I discuss in the next section, within two decades, the 1966 system 
for redistributing power to civil rights and consumer plaintiffs came to be 
seen as useful for the older form of rights claims: torts. The market utilities 
across the litigation landscape are reflected in the MDL data; not only do 
MDLs constitute almost forty percent of the federal civil docket, but also 
some ninety percent of the individual cases that come under MDLs are 
product liability actions. 
I close by analyzing what fifty years of aggregate practice, mixed with other 
shifts in federal practice, has taught. Heavy reliance on MDLs is evidence that 
attempts to eviscerate class actions are dysfunctional—lessening the regulation 
of aggregation while not abating the form. Decades of debating whether classes 
should be mandatory62 have distracted us from understanding how profound 
has been the eclipse of the individual litigation model. Opt-out classes appear 
to validate values of individual autonomy, consent, and participation that have 
come to be associated with due process, but only rarely are clients and lawyers 
able to vote with their feet and go their own way. 
What then are the vital interests of the state for which reconstruction of 
constitutional doctrine and rules are again in order?63 Binding absentees 
 
60 See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
21 (1996). FLSA cases can also proceed as class actions. See Ervin v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 
F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 
62 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort 
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002). 
63 My focus is on courts, but these issues lace informal groupings by lawyers and judges as well 
as administrative agencies, aggregating through grids and rules authorizing agency class actions. For 
example, in the spring of 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans 
Court “has the authority to certify a class for a class action and to maintain similar aggregate 
resolution procedures.” Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also generally Judith 
Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 21-25 (1991) [hereinafter 
Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”]; Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the 
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through aggregation and the preclusion of class actions by signatures on 
employment applications and consumer product circulars reflect the 
diminution of individual authorship and participation in events that structure 
their rights. But the two have divergent goals. Despite incursions on 
individual volition, class actions and MDLs enhance another form of 
autonomy—the ability to participate in collective efforts to obtain redress in 
public for alleged illegalities. In contrast, barring aggregation stifles joint 
action and closes off needed resources, thereby reducing the ability to bring 
to public light claims for rights and remedies. 
Further, the numbers of lawsuits filed by unrepresented individuals 
demonstrate the hopes that people have in courts as well as the misfit between 
institutions designed for lawyers and the efforts of non-professionals to use 
them. Unrepresented individuals pose challenges for their opponents and for 
judges. Although often assumed to have cases without legal merit, a 
significant number of the cases that reached trial in the federal courts in 2015 
had included unrepresented litigants. In the 2975 cases that we identified in 
which trials began that year, about 450 cases (fifteen percent) included 
unrepresented litigants on one or both sides.64 In short, in a world full of 
rights and riddled with inequality, the federal courts need to anchor their own 
legitimacy by finding ways to enable claimants to pool resources. Hence, 
courts themselves have become all the more dependent on aggregation for 
their own ability to function. 
But even as court-based aggregation enhances the capacity to pursue 
rights, the current practices are not sufficiently responsive to other vital 
interests of democratic orders, encoded in the United States in due process 
and the First Amendment guarantees protecting access by the public to court 
processes. Aggregate lawsuits do not end at settlement because time is needed 
to implement remedies, and information is often developed post-settlement 
about the challenges of enforcement. 
Yet, as I sketch here and elaborate in a related essay,65 neither current rules 
nor doctrine have structured post-settlement decisionmaking to protect litigant 
interests, to respond to disagreements about distributions, and to make 
accessible to the public the processes and results. Due process concerns about 
the adequacy of representation ought to come into play not only at certification 
and when settlements are approved but also thereafter, as decisions are made 
about allocation of remedies for sets of individuals within the aggregate. 
 
Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011). 
64 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, Civil Codebook, supra note 40. 
65 Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Forging Post-Settlement Relationships Among 
Litigants, Courts, and the Public in Class and Other Aggregate Litigation, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due]. 
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III. COURTING COLLECTIVITY: ACCESS SUBSIDIES, LITIGATION 
INCENTIVES, AND EFFICIENCY BOOSTS 
A. “By any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and 
other employees similarly situated”: The Fair Labor Standards Act 
To understand the transformation in the 1950s and 1960s of 
constitutionally licit collective action requires context. Two markers create 
the frame: the 1938 version of Rule 23 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
In July 1938, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the School of Law 
of Western Reserve University in Ohio hosted an “Institute on Federal 
Rules.”66 Arthur Vanderbilt, then President of the ABA, described the event 
as the “first time that lawyers from all over the country had come together to 
go to school.”67 
One of the presenters, Charles Clark, the 1938 Rules Reporter, called the 
version of the class action rule a “real attempt at clarification of . . . an ancient 
rule of equity and . . . allowed under code practice, but the limits of which 
have always been rather doubtful.”68 Clark explained that this Rule 23 was 
“not designed to state new principles” but to make the old rule “more usable” 
by distinguishing three forms of class actions: “true class suit,” in which all 
within the class had a “joint, or common” right; the “hybrid class suit,” where 
a common property was to be adjudicated; and the “spurious class action,” in 
which rights were separate and for which the Rule had found “a place in the 
federal system.”69 
 
66 See RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
WITH NOTES, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES iii (William W. 
Dawson ed., 1938). 
67 Id. at 177. 
68 Id. at 263. 
69 Id. at 263-65. The 1938 version of Rule 23 read in pertinent part: 
a. Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it 
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will 
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued 
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is 
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that an owner of a primary right refuses 
to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; or 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may 
affect specific property involved in the action; or 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights 
and a common relief is sought . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1940). The first was seen as a “true” class, the second a “hybrid” class, and the 
third a “spurious” class. JAMES W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2235-41 (1938). 
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As noted, in the same year (and subsequently overshadowed by the 1966 
class action rule70), Congress enacted the FLSA71—or, as a 1939 symposium 
called it, “The Wage and Hour Law.”72 The statute required minimum 
wages (not “less than the new 30-cent minimum hourly wage”) and overtime 
pay (if working more than “42 hours weekly”).73 About eleven million 
employees were estimated to be covered in 1939,74 and enforcement came by 
way of criminal prosecution, civil injunctions, and private lawsuits.75 
Section 16(b) of the original statute bears reading, for it not only created 
what today are called litigation incentives, but also what could have been 
understood to permit lawsuits akin to what the 1966 class action rule 
authorized. 
Any employer who violates the . . . [minimum wage or maximum hours 
provisions] . . . shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the 
amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime 
compensation, . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 
Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent 
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 
themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or 
employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action 
for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action 
shall, in addition to any judgment award to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a 
reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant and costs of the action.76 
What kind of lawsuits did the 1938 FLSA create? The one comment in 
the legislative history on enforcement under this provision came from a 
congressman who described private suits as having the “virtue of minimizing 
the cost of enforcement by the Government;” the self-help provision “puts 
directly into the hands” of employees a means to “assert and enforce their 
 
70 See Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a Class: The 
Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor 
Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1321 (2008). 
71 1938 FLSA, supra note 55, § 16(b). 
72 Paul H. Sanders, Foreword, The Wage and Hour Law, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 321 
(1939). 
73 Id. 
74 Carroll R. Daugherty, The Economic Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act: A Statistical 
Study, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 406, 409 (1939). 
75 A contemporary example of the multiple avenues for enforcement is Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, which was filed both as a collective action and a class action; the jury verdict “combined 
the two.” 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1054 n.1 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
76 1938 FLSA, supra note 55, § 16(b). 
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own rights, thus avoiding the assumption by Government of the sole 
responsibility to enforce the Act.”77 
Other virtues ascribed to the FLSA sound familiar to those steeped in 
discussions of Rule 23 and MDL. In 1942, James Rahl, an attorney in the U.S. 
Office of Price Administration that was charged with implementing the 
FLSA, explained: 
To require each employee to sue individually might well congest court 
calendars immeasurably and produce long delays in the gaining of rightful 
recoveries. Joinder in cases where it would be permissible under the practice 
rules of the jurisdiction might prove an impracticable and cumbersome 
device, and in some jurisdictions might be totally ineffective if interpreted 
strictly according to some of the rules of permissive joinder.78 
Yet, as Rahl noted, while vesting authority in “any court of competent 
jurisdiction” (and hence enlisting state as well as federal courts), the collective 
action provision did not detail “the requirements to be satisfied, the 
procedure for courts to follow in reaching a decision as to the numerous 
individual claims, and the process and effect of judgment.”79 
A brief overview of 1940s FLSA opinions provides windows into then-
understood constitutional limits on representative actions, the efforts by 
federal judges within those constraints to use the FLSA to respond to 
employee vulnerability, and docket concerns. First, decisions within a decade 
of the FLSA’s enactment reflected federal judges’ anxiety that, if employees 
were to be included “who did not wish to enter their appearance,” Section 
16(b) could be “unconstitutional.”80 Lower court federal judges read the 
“constitutional requirement of due process of law” as requiring employees 
 
77 83 CONG. REC. 9264 (1938) (statement of Rep. Kent Ellsworth Keller); see also Joseph V. 
Lane, Jr., Is the Fair Labor Standards Act Fairly Construed?, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 60, 66 (1944). 
78 James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
37 U. ILL. L. REV. 119, 123 (1942). Rahl attempted to fill the gap by setting forth suggested 
procedures to use. Id. at 134-36. 
79 Id. at 123. The 1938 FLSA also made retaliation a criminal offense. Within a year of the 
enactment, one commentator tallied six criminal prosecutions and sixteen civil enforcement actions 
brought by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, as well as twenty-five “civil 
employee suits.” Samuel Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 368, 385-86, nn.114-15, 387-88 n.126 (1939). 
80 Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. Iowa 1946) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 
311 U.S. 32 (1940)); see also Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941). To glimpse 
how courts applied § 16(b) in its first decade, I reviewed the thirty-seven cases flagged as “Notes of 
Decision” annotations in Westlaw between 1938 and 1948 under “Class or Group Actions, Parties 
and Pleadings” and “Consent to be parties, parties and pleadings.” 
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personally to intervene or through other “affirmative action” record that they 
had designated the representative plaintiff to “proceed” on their behalf.81  
As one judge explained, Congress could not “force one to become a 
plaintiff against his will or without his consent, or to select for him an agent 
or attorney to represent him.”82 Another opined that, “regardless of the 
academic question of whether or not [the FLSA provision was] a true class 
suit,” the Constitution required approval by those who were to be 
represented.83 Such opinions reflected the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
1940 ruling in Hansberry v. Lee, famously holding that a prior enforcement 
action of a racially restrictive covenant could not constitutionally preclude a 
new challenge because the earlier representative did not have the same 
interests as those purported to be represented.84 In the FLSA context, despite 
the close alignment of interests among employees, federal judges insisted that 
each employee assent to representation by a fellow employee. 
Judges were nonetheless determined to find ways to welcome additional 
litigants into FLSA proceedings. Thus, although wage and hour claims were 
not “identical,” and hence not a “true” class action, judges concluded that they 
were sufficiently “similar” (arising “out of the same character of 
employment”) to be “presented and adjudicated” together even as they were 
also “separate and independent of each other.”85 The key elements were that 
individuals specifically consented and that “certain questions of both law and 
fact” (such as whether they worked in interstate commerce) were “common 
to all employees.”86 
Second, judges read the statute to empower employees by easing access 
to courts and by enabling safety in numbers. Courts interpreted Section 16(b) 
as liberalizing intervention rules,87 such that all “who care to come into the 
case” could join, including simply by notifying the court (rather than a lawyer 
filing a motion) that they had signed onto a lawsuit.88 Moreover, for purposes 
of the statute of limitations, intervention was deemed by some judges to date 
back to the filing of “the main suit.”89 Further, judges understood that 
collectivity protected vulnerable employees. As one circuit court explained in 
 
81 Shain, 40 F. Supp. at 488, 490; see also Swettman v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 
(S.D. Ill. 1946); Calabrese v. Chiumento, 3 F.R.D. 435, 437 (D. N.J. 1944); Smith v. Stark Trucking, 
Inc., 53 F. Supp. 826, 827 (N.D. Ohio 1943). 
82 Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 45 F. Supp. 986, 989 (1941). Furthermore, “the 
defendant has a right to know by whom it is being sued and for what . . . .” Id. at 990. 
83 Shain, 40 F. Supp. at 490. 
84 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940). 
85 Shain, 40 F. Supp. at 490. 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519, 520 (N.D. Ga. 1940). 
88 Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. Iowa 1946). 
89 Id. 
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1945, “no one of them need stand alone in doing something likely to incur the 
displeasure of an employer.”90 
Third, judges repeatedly expressed concerns about how to respond to an 
expected large number of new filings. To “prevent a multiplicity of suits,” 
lower courts read the FLSA to permit spurious class actions91 or easy 
intervention.92 Through liberalizing the administration of the Act, they used 
the FLSA to avoid “a litigious situation.”93 
Having sketched the first decade of the FLSA, a brief review of what followed 
is in order. Cutbacks came in 1947 when Congress revisited the terms of its 
collective action provision. Prompted by interest in correcting the Supreme 
Court’s reading of the FLSA to require compensation “portal-to-portal,” 
Congress revised Section 16(b) by limiting initiation of private damage actions 
to employees (rather than representatives such as unions) and by expressly 
requiring employees who were joined to (in contemporary parlance) opt-in by 
filing written consent in court.94 The FLSA continues to include incentives, 
including the award to plaintiffs of reasonable attorneys’ fees and of costs paid to 
losing defendants.95 Further, akin to Rule 23, judges have a role in overseeing 
settlements; the Supreme Court has interpreted the FLSA to prohibit 
settlements that had employers pay less than the law required.96 
B. Due Process Shifts: Mullane, the Puzzle of Notice,  
and the Ambitions of Rule 23 
The FLSA did not invent legislative incentives. Encouraging private 
enforcement of new federal rights has a long history, dating back to the Civil 
 
90 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3rd Cir. 1945). The FLSA thus “brings something 
of the strength of collective bargaining to a collective lawsuit.” Id. 
91 Id. at 854 n.6. 
92 See, e.g., Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 62 F. Supp. 361, 362 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Winslow v. Nat’l Elec. 
Prods. Corp., 5 F.R.D. 126, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1946); Culver v. Bell & Loffland, Inc., 146 F.2d 29, 31 (9th 
Cir. 1944). 
93 Barrett v. Nat’l Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416 (W.D. Pa. 1946); see 
also Fink v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 65 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D. Minn. 1941). 
94 See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87. The Supreme 
Court addressed the mechanisms in Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, and committed to district 
courts the discretion to facilitate notice to employees who might be interested in joining. 493 U.S. 
165, 169-73 (1989); see also David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective 
Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP’T POL’Y J. 129, 130 (2003). 
95 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, amended by Pub. L. 110-233, § 302(a), 122 Stat. 920 (2008). 
96 D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 108 (1946). Some lower courts thereafter held 
that settlements require the supervision of the Department of Labor or the federal courts. See, e.g., 
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1982); Dees v. Hydradry, 
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Court assessment resembles the inquiry under 
Rule 23(e) for approval of class action settlements with an added criterion of whether a compromise 
“frustrates implementation of the FLSA.” Id. at 1241. 
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Rights Act of 1871 and the Sherman Antitrust Act.97 But the FLSA’s collective 
action provisions were innovative. Even if read in then-conventional terms, 
the practice under the FLSA made plain the utility of bringing individuals 
together to generate what was described as “countervailing power.”98 
Of course, the FLSA was part of a broader set of developments, running 
from the New Deal through the War on Poverty, the Second Reconstruction, 
and the civil rights, consumer, environmental, and equality movements of the 
second half of the twentieth century. Equipping these rights-holders was at 
the heart of the revisions of Rule 23, drafted in the 1960s by the committee 
appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren and chaired by Dean Acheson.99 
Doing so entailed expanding the reach of courts, just as had been done a 
decade earlier, albeit in service of a different set of litigants—banks seeking 
to obtain judicial confirmation that their investments had been prudent so as 
to preclude beneficiaries from bringing challenges to their decisions. In 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,100 the Supreme Court approved 
a New York provision requiring banks periodically to file a kind of declaratory 
action (“settling accounts”); once a judgment was entered on their behalf, the 
law of res judicata would block any unhappy beneficiary seeking subsequently 
to allege investment failures.101 But unlike the 1966 version of Rule 23 in 
which claimants stepped forward as representatives of the group, the New 
York statute provided that judges appoint lawyers to serve as guardians ad 
litem. As the name of the case reflects, Kenneth Mullane was designated to 
represent what was functionally one subclass, the inter-vivos beneficiaries; 
the other appointee, James Vaughn, assigned the testamentary beneficiaries, 
did not contest the procedures.102 
 
97 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010). 
98 Luke Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462, 478-82 (2017); 
see also generally Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016). 
99 See Announcement of the Chief Justice of the United States, Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, Apr. 4, 1960, in 28 U.S.C.A. at xvii (West 1960). 
100 339 U.S. 306 (1950). For a detailed account of the New York State Legislature’s practices 
that led to Mullane, see Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 38, at 134-42. 
101 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 188-a (1937) (codified as revised at N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c 
(Consol. 2008)). Several other states authorized pool trusts without creating this form of accounting. 
Leubsdorf, supra note 51, at 1708. 
102 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 188-a (1937). In the Papers of Justice Robert Jackson, who wrote the 
opinion for the Court, Justice Hugo Black noted in correspondence before the final version of the 
Mullane decision that the ruling requiring notice would apply to all beneficiaries. See Supplemental 
Notes re First Draft of Opinion, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, 1816–1983 [hereinafter Justice Jackson 
Papers] (on file at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 164, No. 378, Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.) (“although the question as to what is required as to those 
interested in the principal is not before the court, I am sure that whatever we say [about] income 
beneficiaries would be understood as applying to principal beneficiaries. HCB”). The Library of 
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The holding in Mullane may, in hindsight, seem obvious. But at the time, 
the Court had to leap over entrenched distinctions between “in rem” and “in 
personam” jurisdiction as well as ideas that personal participation was requisite 
(as the FLSA 1940s case law reflected). The Court expanded the ability of states 
to bind individuals outside their physical boundaries by upholding what is, in 
today’s terms, nationwide jurisdiction, using the location of the trust and 
personal jurisdiction over the trustee as the hooks that empowered states to 
bring all the beneficiaries, wherever they lived, before their courts. Yet the 
Court tempered its ruling by finding that the statutory method of providing 
notice violated the Constitution.103 Justice Jackson read due process as not 
imposing “impossible or impractical obstacles” to producing a decision about 
the banks’ prudence, while also requiring an “opportunity” for those affected 
to know so as to be able to present objections.104 
One issue for the Court to address was the mechanics of letting people 
know their rights were being determined, and another was the purpose. 
Mullane held that when names of beneficiaries were “at hand” and “easily” 
found on the bank’s books, notice by publication was constitutionally 
deficient.105 Yet the Court did not want to impose too great an economic 
burden on the underlying activity. The Court did not offer an in-depth 
theoretical account of what today we term “interest representation” but 
explained that an “individual interest does not stand alone” but was “identical 
with that of a class.”106 Thus, notice to those whose addresses were readily 
available sufficed, as everyone shared the same interests in “the integrity of 
the fund and the fidelity of the trustee.”107 
The Court explained that the purpose of the notice was to elicit 
objections: “notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in 
objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objections 
 
Congress has archived these papers and created a finding guide, made available at http://hdl.loc.gov/
loc.mss/eadmss.ms003002 [https://perma.cc/LZY8-NALB]. 
103 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312-13, 320. Justice Black’s notes before the decision to Justice Jackson 
discussed the authority of a court to “discharge the trustee of further liability for the acts it 
approves.” Memorandum to Justice Jackson from Justice Black, Dated 3/3/50 (on file at Justice 
Jackson Papers, supra note 102, Box 164, No. 378). 
104 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. The reminder for those steeped in contemporary state action 
requirements is that the dispute was between private parties, enlisting the state courts to settle the 
accountings. 
105 Id. at 318-19. 
106 Id. at 319. 
107 Id. Justice Jackson’s notes on and outline of the opinion mentioned the importance of 
avoiding the costs of “wild-goose chases” and that providing notice to the “bulk” would protect the 
interests of others. Outline of Present Opinion, Dated 3/21/50 (on file at Justice Jackson Papers, 
supra note 102, Box 164, No. 378); Outline, Dated 3/25/50 Subheadings E&F (on file at Justice 
Jackson Papers, supra note 102, Box 164, No. 378). 
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sustained would inure to the benefit of all.”108 The Court may have assumed 
the responsiveness to objections, but it did not address directly that New York 
provided no method of exit; these property holders were placed in what came 
to be called a mandatory class.109 
In today’s terms of voice, loyalty, and bonding, we can theorize that those 
noticed could both provide information to and monitor the actions of their 
court-selected representatives. Yet the individually small stakes made 
responses (in, and especially outside of, New York) unlikely. Indeed, in the 
last sixty years, during which pooled funds came to control billions of dollars, 
neither recorded challenges by beneficiaries nor successful challenges by 
guardians ad litem have been identified.110 
But to focus on filed objections in cases as the only metric is wrong. 
Broadcasting information raised the potential of oversight that could affect 
decisionmaking, even if assessing the impact on investments and distribution 
of funds is difficult.111 More generally, Mullane provided a constitutional path 
to large-scale resolutions by courts whose legitimacy to bind absentees rested 
on telling a subset that their interests were being determined through a 
representative structure. And, as I analyze in a related essay, Mullane’s 
insistence on notice put the fact of aggregation before a large set of claimants 
and thereby forced information into the public arena.112 
Mullane’s potential was realized in the 1966 revisions to Rule 23. We know 
from records of the Advisory Committee that a goal of the revision was to 
bind absentees beyond those in a “true” class action.113 While the Mullane 
 
108 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319. 
109 The Court identified two forms of property interests: the “rights to have the trustee answer 
for negligent or illegal impairments,” and the risk of a “diminution” in their funds through an 
“allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their names but without their knowledge, may 
conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest.” Id. at 313. 
110 See Leubsdorf, supra note 51, at 1725-27. 
111 See generally John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005). 
112 See Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due, supra note 65. 
113 A note on sources is required. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has posted 
a subset of materials from the Rules Committees on its website, including rules suggestions and 
comments, committee reports, and meeting minutes. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, RECORDS AND ARCHIVES OF THE RULES COMMITTEES, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees [https://perma.cc/24CU-5A5y]. In addition, I 
reviewed unpublished materials then located in boxes housed in the late 1980s at the National 
Records Center in Record Group No. 116, Accession No. 82-0028. Thereafter, the Congressional 
Information Service (CIS) put some National Archive Records on microfiche. The Harvard Law 
Library has also made available Benjamin Kaplan’s papers in its Special Collections. These materials 
are archived at Harvard, but currently, law review conventions use the phrase “on file at” which is 
invoked here as well. See Papers of Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
1961–1965 [hereinafter Kaplan Papers] (on file at the Harvard Law Library, Historical and Special 
Collections). Harvard created a finding guide, entitled “Kaplan, Benjamin. Papers, 1939–2010: 
Finding Aid,” made available at http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00250 [https://
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Court changed due process doctrine to facilitate the viability of then-new 
economic products, the 1966 rule drafters had other kinds of problems in 
mind. The implementation of school desegregation orders was one concern. 
Individual students bringing discrimination claims were seen as each holding 
a separate right; the class actions filed on their behalf were then 
conceptualized as “spurious” rather than “true” class actions. Rule 23 drafters 
wanted to ensure that after any particular student-plaintiff graduated, others 
could go to court to enforce injunctions.114 Thus, rule drafters created what 
became Rule 23(b)(2), authorizing class treatment with no exit by co-plaintiffs 
when the “party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class” and injunctive relief was appropriate.115 
Also in focus were cases involving limited funds, in which plaintiffs could 
be in competition with each other when remedies were ordered. Defendants 
could also be at risk of being required in one case to change their behavior, but 
not in another—or what through Rule 23(b)(1) came to be termed 
“incompatible standards of conduct,” for which the Rule authorized class action 
treatment. Small claimants posed another problem to be solved by the rule 
drafters, who saw the need to enable access for those who lacked the resources 
and knowledge to pursue rights. The drafting of 23(b)(3) gave such groups—
when class treatment was “superior” to individual actions—routes to collective 
actions in court.116 
The question of the constitutionality of bundling all these kinds of class 
members together for a final adjudication was addressed in a 1962 memo  by 
the Reporter and drafter of Rule 23, Professor Benjamin Kaplan of Harvard 
Law School, who was joined by Professor Al Sacks as the Associate Reporter. 
That memo, outlining a “tentative” proposal, moved beyond the assumptions 
 
perma.cc/K2JX-L7F5]. Most of the memoranda were not signed, and not all were dated. Some have 
handwritten notes on them, and some include notations that they were co-authored by Albert Sacks, 
also a Harvard Law professor and the Associate Reporter to the Advisory Committee. 
I have also reviewed portions of the archival materials of Albert Sacks, which are archived at 
the Harvard Law Library’s Special Collections. See Papers of Albert Sacks, 1915–1991 [hereinafter 
Sacks Papers] (on file at the Harvard Law Library, Historical and Special Collections). Materials 
focus on discovery reform but some reference is made to Rule 23; one letter, dated June 29, 1967, 
from Sacks to the Hon. William H. Becker, questioned that judge’s view that a class action could be 
certified as a 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) class, and noted that “Ben Kaplan concurs in the general 
thoughts” in the letter and that “[b]oth of us have in mind the admonition that an author is 
sometimes the worst judge of the meaning of the language he has produced.” Letter from Albert M. 
Sacks to Hon. William H. Becker 3 (June 29, 1967) (on file at Sacks Papers, supra note 113, Box 142-
6). In addition, I benefitted from research materials provided by Andrew Bradt from the papers of 
Dean Phil Neal, who helped to shape MDL, and which are archived at the University of Chicago. 
114 See 1966 Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 
F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). 
115 1966 Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 96 (1966). 
116 Id. 
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that permeated the FLSA decisions of the 1940s.117 The 1960s memos did not 
equate the constitutionality of class actions with individual notice but 
recommended leaving “to the discretion of the judge on the firing line” the 
decision on the “character and timing” of notice.118 As the memo put it, the 
“question whether a binding class action is proper must not become tied in 
mechanical fashion to the question whether notice has been given; the grand 
criterion for a class action remains the homogenous character of the class.”119 
The Reporters explained that what was needed was a court with a 
“sufficient connection with a class situation,” so that it could (borrowing the 
phrase from an article discussing Mullane120) exercise “jurisdiction by 
necessity” and bind absentees.121 Reflecting Mullane’s structure, Kaplan and 
Sacks were not focused on rights of exclusion and did not assume that class 
members had an “absolute right to ‘opt out.’”122 Such opportunities might not 
 
117 Unsigned Memorandum, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class 
Actions—Rule 23 (May 28-30, 1962) [hereinafter Tentative Proposal to Modify Class Actions 1962 
Memorandum] (on file at Kaplan Papers, supra note 113, Box 75, Folder 5), microformed on CIS No. 
CI-6309-44 (Cong. Info. Serv.).  
The FLSA was discussed occasionally. For example, committee member John Frank argued that 
FLSA cases provided examples of why the drafters ought to worry about champerty. Unsigned 
Memorandum, Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts, Handwritten Dated Aug. 1962, 14 
[hereinafter Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962 Memorandum] (on file at Kaplan Papers, 
supra note 113, Box 75, Folder 2). Another memo noted that the FLSA seemed to “envision a standard 
class action” but that case law did not support that interpretation. Tentative Proposal to Modify 
Class Actions 1962 Memorandum, supra note 117, at EE-28. Congress might not have wanted to 
“bind any particular employee by the adverse result of a suit in which he had not explicitly consented 
to join as a party.” Id. Another mention comes in the 1965 Advisory Committee note: “Reference is 
also made to ‘wage hour’ cases but these are covered by special legislation having a special history.” 
Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to the Standing Comm. on Practice & 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States 8 n.3 (June 10, 1965), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV06-1965.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCU8-
DBV6]; see also Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United 
States District Courts, reprinted in 34 F.R.D. 325, 384-95 (1964); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory 
committee’s note to 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 
118 Tentative Proposal to Modify Class Actions 1962 Memorandum, supra note 117, at EE-12. 
Given that the memorandum references “we” and in that a later, related 1963 memorandum had a 
cover sheet with the initials of both Kaplan and Sacks, the 1962 memo was possibly co-authored by 
the two. Sacks became the Associate Reporter in 1961, and he worked closely with Maurice 
Rosenberg, a Columbia Law professor, on rules governing discovery. That memo also noted 
that Hansberry v. Lee could be read to have given notice “independent significance” in deciding 
whether a class action comported with due process in binding “outsiders.” Id. at EE-10, EE-11. 
119 Id. at EE-11 n.5. 
120 See George B. Fraser, Jr., Jurisdiction by Necessity—An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. 
PA. L. REV. 305 (1951). 
121 Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962 Memorandum, supra note 117, at 9 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
122 Id. at 9-11. As is familiar to scholars of Rule 23, drafts vested a great deal of discretion in 
district judges, including whether to permit individuals to exclude themselves. For example, in a 
January 31, 1964 memo, Kaplan and Sacks suggested that judges ought to decide whether class 
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have seemed relevant, as discussions in 1962 also raised the option of having 
some one-way class actions through which class members could benefit from 
a favorable judgment but not be adversely affected by an unfavorable one.123 
In another 1962 memo, offering “some further thoughts,” the Reporters 
commented that notice to absentees was especially important for what the 
draft described as “optional” or discretionary class actions (which was the 
basis for what became (b)(3) classes): “[I]f a satisfactory manner of giving 
notice is employed, it seems likely that the requirements of the due process 
clause will be satisfied.”124 Moreover, “common decency” entailed taking some 
“steps” to let those affected by a litigation know that it was “under way.”125 That 
memo also explained that notice was not to be equated with personal service of 
process, nor to be turned into a vehicle for attorneys to solicit clients.126 
Even as the Reporters said that notice and “adequate representation” 
sufficed to assuage “doubts about the constitutionality of the representative 
procedure,” they questioned “how much ‘individual freedom’ each member of 
the class” actually had; the “pressure” to submit and “be bound . . . by a 
‘model’ trial [would] often be so high” as to constitute “compulsion.”127 The 
memo also noted that individuals did not have a “meaningful” interest in 
pursuing an individual lawsuit if “a single district” was “obviously and pre-
eminently the most convenient forum.”128 
The memos from 1962 mentioned both Hansberry and Mullane and reflected 
how opaque the Supreme Court case law was about what was required to bind 
absentees. The 1940 Hansberry ruling refused to enforce racially restrictive 
covenants because the prior representatives had interests that were “not 
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to 
 
members’ “inclusion” was “essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy” and to 
state reasons for doing so. Benjamin Kaplan & Al Sacks, Memorandum to the Advisory Committee, 
(A) Discussion of Responses to Memorandum of December 2, 1963; (B) Recommendation that the 
Amendment as Revised Be Promptly Circulated to the Public for Comment and Criticism at 5 (Jan. 
31, 1964), microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-08 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (emphasis in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The drafters were not focused on providing an “absolute right to ‘opt 
out’” until the end of the drafting period, when the rule that was promulgated included opt-out 
rights for Rule 23(b)(3) class members. Id. at 1. 
123 Unsigned Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-4 to EE-7 (Feb. 
1963) [hereinafter Modification of Rule 23 1963 Memorandum] (on file at Kaplan Papers, supra note 
113, Box 79, Folder 4), microformed on CIS No. CI-6313-56 (Cong. Info Serv.). Those views reflect 
the influence of an article by Kalven and Rosenthal, who had argued in 1941 that if a class 
representative won, absentees should be able to benefit even if they were not to be bound by a loss. 
Kalven & Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 701. 
124 Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962 Memorandum, supra note 117, at 9. 
125 Modification of Rule 23 1963 Memorandum, supra note 123, at EE-5 (quoting Professor 
Zechariah Chafee). 
126 Id. 
127 Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962 Memorandum, supra note 117, at 10. 
128 Id. at 11. 
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represent” and therefore, the Court concluded, did not give absentees what due 
process required.129 The due process problem was disunity of interests, and the 
Court did not discuss notice as the solution. 
But the Court left the door open for other ways of binding absentees: if 
rights of class members turned on “a single issue of fact or law,” states could 
create mechanisms to preclude subsequent litigation.130 Required were 
procedures “devised and applied as to insure that those present are of the 
same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure 
the full and fair consideration of the common issue.”131 
In 1964, the Advisory Committee circulated for public comment a draft 
rule that included provisions for what would become (b)(3) class actions. The 
Committee spoke of “reasonable notice” for such class members but discussed 
“specific notice” only for “each member known to be engaged in a separate 
suit on the same subject matter with the party opposed to the class.”132 
Moreover, the 1964 version proposed that judges had to approve requests for 
opting out.133 The draft instructed members to “request exclusion” by a date 
specified by the judge, and told judges to permit exit “unless the court finds 
that their inclusion is essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy and states its reasons therefor.”134 
Indeed, as promulgated in 1966, Rule 23 did not mandate notice at the 
outset for its (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes of the pendency of the class action.135 
Further, while Rule 23 called for “reasonable notice” if a dismissal or 
compromise was in the offing, it did not detail the kind, quality, or 
comprehensiveness of that notice. And, for (b)(3) classes, Rule 23 invoked 
Mullane’s standard of the “best notice practicable under the circumstances,”136 
 
129 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940). The Court stated that only fifty-four percent of the owners of the 
footage had signed the restrictive covenants; yet a search of the land records does not support that 
proposition. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class Action, 
in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 233 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
130 311 U.S. at 43. 
131 Id. One illustration of a licit procedure came a decade after Hansberry in Mullane, but the 
Court was focused on a state statute requiring the provision of information to beneficiaries. Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 312-20. 
132 Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United 
States District Courts, reprinted in 34 F.R.D. 325, 386-95 (1964). 
133 See id. 
134 Id. at 386. 
135 Amendments in 2003 added that district judges had discretion to require notice for (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2). A prescient essay given to me by its author, Lawrence Fox, 
detailed how the 1966 Rule did not answer “important questions” related to notice – what it entailed 
and who paid for it, “whenever” it was required. Lawrence Fox, Comment, Adequate Representation, 
Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. 
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which could be understood as less demanding than what the 1974 Eisen 
decision read Rule 23 to mandate.137 
A summary is in order to reflect on the distance between constitutional law, 
as judges reading the 1938 FLSA provisions understood it in the 1940s, and what 
the Rule 23 drafters accomplished. Rule 23 drafters were remarkably successful 
in disentangling autonomy, consent, and individualization in litigation from 
the strictures of the Due Process Clause. Their rule, premised on the view that 
judges could readily identify classes when “community or solidarity of interest” 
was strong,138 forced individuals who had filed no consent with a court to be 
parties, bound by outcomes through (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. Even for the (b)(3) 
class action (to be certified if a judge found such a method of adjudication 
“superior” to individual litigation), the Committee did not adopt the FLSA 
“sign-up-with-the-court” model but crafted instead a default of inclusion, 
subject to opting out affirmatively. 
Those decisions paralleled efforts by Congress to ease access to the federal 
courts. The means included the creation of the Legal Services Corporation in 
1974, a fee-shifting statute for civil rights cases in 1976, and a host of new causes 
of action. Rule 23 thus contributed to our understanding of what lawsuits can 
do, as it enabled judges to oversee long-term school desegregation decrees and 
paved the way for parallel structural remedies addressing jails, prisons, mental 
hospitals, and employment.139 
Further, the Rule’s goal of providing for low-value claimants (in Kaplan’s 
words, “without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all”140) 
came to fruition. An equitable doctrine, developed early in the twentieth 
century, evolved into an understanding that class action plaintiff lawyers confer 
a “common benefit” on the class and should be compensated from funds 
recouped; methods range from calculating hourly rates to providing a percentage 
of the fund or some mixture (a “hybrid” approach) of the two.141 Thus, small 
claims turned into potentially lucrative aggregations, enticing lawyers to 
 
L. REV. 889, 906 (1968). Fox argued that the Advisory Committee erred in interpreting Mullane to 
require individual notice in class actions. Id. at 914-15. 
137 See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 S. CT. REV. 97 (1974). 
138 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376 (1967) [hereinafter Kaplan, Continuing Work]. 
139 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary 
in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
140 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) 
[hereinafter Kaplan, A Prefatory Note]. 
141 Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: 
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 337-38 (1996). 
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take the risk of serving as “champions of semi-public rights” and thereby 
augmenting administrative regulatory oversight.142 
IV. THE SUCCESS OF AGGREGATION AS THE NORM:  
THE CASE OF THE TORT AND THE EXPANSION  
OF MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION 
The market-driven structure of Rule 23 was reflected in the rulemakers’ 
exclusion of tort claimants. Given the contingent fee system, the drafters 
wrote about the lack of a “need” to push against the traditions of 
individualization or to face federalism conflicts stemming from Erie’s impact 
on choice of law.143 But, as we know now fifty years later, the aggregate 
structure that they created for civil rights and an array of consumers would 
not only be used by tort plaintiffs, but also be needed for them. Indeed, mass 
torts have become a dominant form of large-scale aggregation in the federal 
courts—by way of class actions, multidistrict litigations, and bankruptcies. 
A sketch of why the 1960s class action rule presumptively excluded torts and 
of how torts have become a familiar facet of aggregate litigation—in class actions 
and via MDLs—underscores how assumptions about the individuality of certain 
kinds of claims gave way, as other “vital” state interests came to the fore. Thus, 
a return to the 1962-63 drafting of Rule 23 is in order. 
At the time, the proposed Rule had two, not three, kinds of class actions. 
One category (then labeled Rule 23(c)) addressed “presumptively 
maintainable” class actions, and a second (then 23(d)) covered “class actions 
maintainable in the court’s discretion.”144 But in 1963, the drafters considered 
following the 1938 pattern of delineating three categories, even as they were 
abandoning the 1938 Rule’s reason (distinguishing between binding and 
nonbinding class actions) for doing so. Kaplan commented that the absence of 
categories “might also tend toward the indiscriminate use of the class-action 
device in ‘mass tort’ situations, a result surely to be avoided.”145 At the time, the 
referent was train or plane crashes, fires, and the collapse of building structures. 
 
142 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 46, at 717. 
143 As one of the 1962 memos explained: “If the claim is fairly large, then, at least if a 
contingent-fee arrangement is available, there is no need for the individual claimant to resort to a 
class action in order to get his lawyer properly paid.” Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962 
Memorandum, supra note 117, at 11-12. 
144 Modification of Rule 23 1963 Memorandum, supra note 123, at EE-10, EE-11. 
145 Id. at EE-1. 
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Kaplan discussed that torts would be unlikely to meet the criteria of the 
Rule, as individuals would pursue their own cases, and differing state tort law 
would result in divergent governing law.146 Kaplan proposed a note to state: 
A “mass accident” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is on its face not 
appealing for a class action because of the likelihood that significant 
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would 
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances 
an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice 
into multiple lawsuits separately tried.147 
John Frank, a committee member, responded that he was “unpersuadably 
opposed to the use of the class action in the mass tort situation.”148 Frank was 
also of the view that Rule 23 ought to be limited to civil rights claims alone,149 
of which he was a staunch supporter.150 Kaplan replied that eliminating the 
reach of the proposed class action rule would be “so retrograde a move” as to 
prevent publication of any revised draft.151 
Whether Kaplan wanted to mollify an adamant committee member or 
believed torts ill-suited for class treatment,152 he wrote to Frank that he too 
was “anxious to keep [mass accidents] out.”153 
It seems to me that it would strain interpretation to say that particular actions 
by injured parties in a mass accident will ‘impair or impede the ability of the 
other members to protect their interests;’ th[is] clause is redolent of claims 
against a fund.154 
 
146 See Transcript of the Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963 Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules Meeting, 
Discussion of Rule 23-Topic EE 5 [hereinafter Advisory Committee 1963 Transcript] (on file at 
Kaplan Papers, supra note 113, Box 81, Folder 7), microformed on CI-7104-53. 
147 Id. Kaplan quoted from the proposed Rule 23 note at the October 1963 meeting. 
148 Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan 2-3 (Jan. 21, 1963) (on file at Kaplan Papers, 
supra note 113, Box 79, Folder 2). 
149 See Advisory Committee 1963 Transcript, supra note 146, at 8-10, 20 (statements of John P. 
Frank). Frank argued the potential for “fraud,” with defendants trying to buy off plaintiffs’ attorneys 
to cut off future claims. Id. at 9. 
150 For example, while teaching at Yale Law School, Frank joined Thomas Emerson in 
organizing a brief in 1949 on behalf of 189 law professors supporting the integration of law schools. 
Brief for Petitioner at 1-4, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44). 
151 Advisory Committee 1963 Transcript, supra note 146, at 10. 
152 Kaplan stated that he was not arguing a “wild appeal to bring in mass accidents,” but sought 
a flexible rule that permitted judges to decide what kinds of cases fell within it. Id. at 10-12. Yet, 
when Judge Wyzanski commented that he was not as concerned about “the risk with respect to the 
mass accident,” Kaplan replied that “the case of a mass accident will be, and probably ought to be, 
excluded from the class suit.” Id. at 14. 
153 Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank 2 (Feb. 7, 1963) (on file at Kaplan Papers, 
supra note 113, Box 79, Folder 6). 
154 Id. 
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The result was what became a Committee note accompanying Rule 23(b)(3) 
and stating that “a ‘mass accident’ . . . is ordinarily not appropriate for a class 
action . . . .”155 
In comments published subsequently, Kaplan did not suggest that excluding 
mass accidents was a constitutional imperative; rather, practical problems stood 
in the way. Indeed, when describing the Rule’s ambit, Kaplan acknowledged 
the “dilution of procedural safeguards” entailed in Rule 23(b)(3).156 Kaplan 
distinguished between “some litigious situations affecting numerous persons 
‘naturally’ or ‘necessarily’ [which] called for unitary adjudication,”157 and 
those involving “individual preference,”158 for which opting out would be 
provided. Class treatment was not needed “where the stake of each member 
bulks large and his will and ability to take care of himself are strong.”159 
These exchanges reflect that, at the time, the contingency fee system 
seemed viable to equip tort victims, and defendants and their insurance 
companies appeared to have funds sufficient to cover any dollars awarded in 
mass accidents. Furthermore, to include torts might have prompted opposition 
from contingent fee attorneys. Given the rule drafters’ ambitions, tort cases 
were not a priority for which they took additional political risks. 
Moreover, another exemplar of damage actions—antitrust cases—were on 
the agenda of a different judicial committee, the Coordinating Committee for 
Multiple Litigation in the United States District Courts, which was charged 
by the Judicial Conference in the 1960s “with developing methods for 
expediting” such “big” cases.160 Its work became the source of the 1968 MDL 
legislation.161 Members of the two committees met in 1963.162 As discussed in 
a transcript of that meeting and a 1963 memorandum, members of both 
 
155 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 
F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 
156 Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 138, at 390; see also Benjamin P. Kaplan, Comments at 
the Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Third Circuit Judicial Conference: The Impact of the 
Electrical Anti-Trust Cases Upon Federal Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 375, 513-18 (1965). 
157 Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 138, at 386. 
158 Id. at 391. Kaplan explained that the rule still permitted individuals to opt out, even when 
their stakes are “so small as to make a separate action impracticable.” Id. at 391. 
159 Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 138, at 391. 
160 Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 63, at 29-30 & n.112; see also Andrew D. Bradt, 
“A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 838 (2017). 
161 Id.; see also Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class 
Action “Alternative”, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711 (2017). 
162 See Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan & Al Sacks to the Chairman & Members of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Completion of the Work Committee Meeting of October 31–
November 2, 1963 4-8 (Dec. 2, 1963) [hereinafter Completion of the Work, Dec. 2, 1963 
Memorandum], microformed on CIS No. CI-7104 (Cong. Info. Serv.). That memo reported on the 
“special meeting” with members of the Coordinating Committee. 
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committees did not view Rule 23 changes as the only vehicle for dealing with 
the challenges that mass accidents posed for the federal courts.163 
Above, I used the 1940s FLSA cases to mark how much work Mullane and 
Rule 23 did to reframe constitutional conventions. The 1966 Committee note, 
warning against the use of class actions for mass torts, offers another baseline 
for measuring change, which again happened relatively quickly. Rule 23’s 
central function was to displace once-conventional constitutional wisdom about 
the legality of binding absent, non-participatory, non-directly consenting 
individuals. That approach became licit in tort and, through other forms of 
aggregation, Rule 23’s modality migrated across the litigation spectrum. 
The practical pressures to aggregate torts came from a rising number of 
individuals injured by the same products or events. The cost of such injuries 
showed that a (b)(1) class (protecting rights-holders to a “limited fund”) could 
well have application to mass torts, as damages sometimes exceeded insurance 
policy funds. Further, the stakes and scale of such cases made plain that the 
individual contingent fee lawyer was not equipped to carry the load. Thus, 
commentators and judges soon questioned the presumption against mass 
torts of the Advisory Committee’s note.164 By the 1980s, federal district 
judges had certified mass tort cases in a range of cases, including famously 
litigation involving Agent Orange.165 
Lessons on aggregation of torts also came from another form of 
litigation—bankruptcy. Tort defendants such as Johns Manville (for asbestos) 
and A.H. Robins (the defendant in the Dalkon Shield IUD litigation) brought 
tort claimants into such proceedings.166 In both class settlements and bankruptcy, 
lawyers and judges invented new structures including “claims facilities,” which 
resembled both insurance companies making payments and mini-court systems 
resolving individual post-liability disputes. In lieu of tort plaintiffs and their 
 
163 Reported was that members of the Coordinating Committee did not think that mass 
accidents ought to be absolutely excluded from Rule 23. Id. at 5. Rather, “no single device . . . [could] 
be expected to ‘solve’ the questions of procedure and management posed by massive litigation 
affecting numerous parties.” Id. at 4. Thus, “a variety of devices” needed to be invented, and rather 
than “stiff rules,” “play in the joints” was “imperatively required.” Id.; see also Bradt, supra note 160. 
164 See, e.g., J. WILLIAM MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23-811, ¶ 23.45 n.35 (Matthew Bender 
ed., 1969). 
165 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff ’d, 818 F.2d 145 
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Pickney v. Dow Chemical, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); see also generally 
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 
(1987). Other examples of certification of mass torts came from asbestos claims. See Jenkins v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, 785 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986). 
166 See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure of the 
Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255 (2005); Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related Litigants 
As Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-
Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 71 (1988); Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield 
Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found), 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992). 
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lawyers operating as solo actors, massive numbers were co-claimants, represented 
by Plaintiff Steering Committees (PSCs) dealing collectively with defense 
lawyers in search of comprehensive settlements (just as banks in the Mullane case 
had sought to preclude large numbers of potential claims). 
By 1988, the Judicial Conference of the United States “approved in principle 
the creation of Federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity to consolidate 
in the Federal courts multiple litigation in State and Federal Courts involving 
personal injury or property damage arising out of a single event or 
occurrence.”167 In 1991, the Judicial Conference endorsed a report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation that recommended aggregate 
treatment of the pending asbestos cases.168 The American Law Institute 
likewise became a proponent, first through a project on “complex litigation” in 
the 1980s and then by endorsing the “principles of aggregation” in 2010.169 But 
as is familiar, the Supreme Court’s decisions in the late 1990s in Amchem and 
in Ortiz took much of the steam out of large-scale mass tort class actions.170 
Yet because a consensus had already emerged that aggregate processing 
was essential, mass torts found a home in MDLs, whose genesis also bears a 
brief reflection. Rising caseloads after World War II and a spate of antitrust 
cases prompted the federal judiciary’s leadership to argue that courts should 
take control of “protracted cases” or those cases would “threaten the judicial 
process itself.”171 In the early 1960s, after the United States had successfully 
pursued antitrust claims against electrical equipment manufacturers, “more 
than 1,800 separate damage actions were filed in 33 federal district courts.”172 
The Judicial Conference created the Coordinating Committee for Multiple 
Litigation of the United States District Courts, which, as I noted, met in 1963 
with the Rules Advisory Committee. Nine federal judges were charged with 
 
167 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 22 (Mar. 15, 1988); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 3406 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong. 17 (1989) (prepared statement of Hon. William W. Schwarzer). 
168 See Linda Greenhouse, Aid Sought from Congress to Ease Asbestos Caseload, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
13, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/13/business/aid-sought-from-congress-to-ease-asbestos-
caseload.html [https://perma.cc/PU4P-SJ65]. 
169 COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990); 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 383-440 (1991); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting 
Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 630 (2011). 
170 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815 (1999). 
171 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER 
PROTRACTED CASES, reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 41, 64 (1951); see also Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, 
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 925, 938 (2000). 
172 Transfer of Pretrial Proceedings in Multidistrict Litigation, H.R. Rep. No. 90-1130, at 2 
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899, 1903. 
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supervising nationwide discovery in these damage antitrust cases, in part 
through “uniform” pretrial orders adopted individually by each of the judges 
before whom the cases were pending.173 
That Committee’s work resulted in the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 
1968,174 which instead of having judges in different districts coordinate by 
adopting parallel orders, transferred all pending cases to a single judge. Akin 
to aspects of the 1966 class action rule, the 1968 MDL legislation created a 
mandatory pretrial aggregation, with no personal rights of consent during that 
phase of the litigation. But because cases were to be “remanded” to the 
originating courts at the conclusion of the “pretrial proceedings,”175 MDL 
appeared to provide only a temporary arrangement and (unlike Rule 23) 
retained the convention of individual lawyers representing individual plaintiffs. 
In contrast to the controversy surrounding Rule 23, MDLs initially 
garnered little attention.176 The divergent responses reflected what once were 
the differing ambitions of the two provisions. Class action revisions aimed to 
enable litigation, as Kaplan had stressed, to help “people who individually 
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at 
all.”177 Class actions enabled sets of new plaintiffs—schoolchildren, prisoners, 
consumers, and employees—to make their way into the federal courts. MDL, 
on the other hand, was assumed to be only a vehicle to expedite cases already 
filed, and thereby to be a managerial effort to protect the judiciary and—to 
some extent—defendants, at risk of redundant and expensive discovery requests. 
Moreover, in its first few decades, the MDL panel appeared to share the 
Rule 23 Advisory Committee’s skepticism about tort aggregation.178 The 
(in)famous example is asbestos. As caseload filings mounted in federal court, 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) repeatedly rejected (in 
1977, 1980, 1986, and 1987) requests to assign the cases to a single judge.179 The 
 
173 Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial 
Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 623 (1964). 
174 Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109. 
175 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). The “remand” requirement was loosely enforced until 1998, 
when the Supreme Court read the statutory text to require sending cases back for trials. Lexecon 
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998). 
176 A shift is underway. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, Foreword, Multidistrict Litigation and 
Aggregation Alternatives, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 877 (2001). Moreover, the 2017 congressional effort 
to restrict class actions included proposed limits on MDLs as well. See Fairness in Class Action 
Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
177 Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, supra note 140, at 497. 
178 Bradt’s account suggests that the decisions of the panel were not in keeping with the 
ambitions of the Coordinating Committee. See Bradt, supra note 160. 
179 See Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation 
(MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 111 & n.80 (2013). 
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JPML’s reasons echoed Kaplan’s 1960s explanation—that these cases lacked the 
requisite commonality and that the existing litigation system sufficed.180 
But, in 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist “appointed an Ad Hoc Committee 
on Asbestos Litigation,” which called for a statutory solution and, in the 
interim, MDL treatment.181 The JPML responded the next year. Quoting the 
Ad Hoc Committee’s description of problems such as “long delays,” the same 
issues “litigated over and over,” as well as high “transaction costs” that could 
exceed “victims’ recovery by nearly two to one” and that could exhaust 
defendants’ assets, the Panel assigned all 26,639 pending cases from 87 federal 
districts to a federal judge in Pennsylvania.182 
Return to the five structural facts about the federal courts, circa 2015, with 
which I began—flattening filings, the rise of MDL garnering almost forty 
percent of the docket, the prevalence of unrepresented litigants, the decline of 
class actions, and the rarity of trials. As those facts reflect, the distinction 
between MDL aggregation for pretrial purposes only and class actions has been 
eclipsed. With the expansion of Rule 16 and the rise of ADR, the “pretrial” is 
the dominant form that all federal litigation takes. Further, aggregate resolutions 
are a common route for both MDLs and class actions, as demonstrated by the 
remand rate in 2015 for MDLs: about nineteen out of twenty cases in an MDL 
closed before being returned to another district for trial.183 
Disaggregating the types of claims in MDLs also makes plain that the 
presumption of individualization in tort has likewise waned. MDLs may 
include class actions, and some tort class actions are certified, with or without 
being a part of an MDL. Further, product liability cases were, as of July 2015, 
about twenty-four percent of the 287 then-pending MDLs; adding air crashes 
brings the total of tort MDLs to approximately a quarter of the MDL 
portfolio.184 As detailed in the pie chart in Figure 7 on pending MDLs by the 
kind of case, when moving from the level of an MDL to the cases within, 
mass torts represented more than 90 percent of the 2015 pending MDL cases. 
 
180 See, e.g., In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 
906, 909-11 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (per curiam). The opinion noted that the parties objected; the Panel 
stated that, while not determinative, such views were relevant. Id. 
181 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (Mar. 12, 1991), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/reports_of_the_proceedings_1991-03_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY4Z-5V7D]. 
182 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416, 419 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
183 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015 5 (2015), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/
files/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A87-
WNPQ] (reporting 1934 cases remanded and 30,695 cases closed by the transferee court). 
184 The data come from Figure 7, Distribution of Pending MDL Actions by Type as of July 15, 
2015, provided for use by Professor Samuel Issacharoff (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review). The chart was part of his Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics at 2 (Presentation at Duke 
University School of Law, Oct. 8, 2015). 
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Figure 7: Distribution of Pending MDL Actions 
by Type as of July 15, 2015185 
 
 
Another distinction drawn in the 1960s—between class actions as enabling 
new cases and MDLs as only expediting cases already filed—has likewise 
dissipated. Under the MDL, the practice of “direct filings” has emerged, in 
which a case is brought into an MDL after the MDL exists, cutting the time 
and costs of filing in what would become a “transfer” court and then be 
“tagging along.”186 MDL opens the door to new cases, some of which may be 
free riders; absent aggregation, such cases would have been too expensive to 
pursue individually, even if meritorious. 
MDLs thus produce the subsidies that Benjamin Kaplan praised class 
actions for creating. Further, judges have supervising roles in each. Under 
revisions in 2003 of Rule 23 and in MDL practice, judges identify the lawyers 
 
185 Id. 
186 Case management orders or stipulations may provide that jurisdiction or venue will not be 
contested. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 795-97 (2012). A recent example of direct filing comes 
from several related MDLs about a product defect. In February of 2012, the JPML assigned a federal 
district judge in West Virginia some 150 cases related to failures of transvaginal mesh, used for pelvic 
surgery repairs. C. Gavin Shephard, Transvaginal Mesh Litigation: A New Opportunity to Resolve Mass 
Medical Device Failure Claims, 80 TENN. L. REV. 477, 478 (2013). By the fall of 2015, more than 
70,000 pending cases were part of the seven transvaginal mesh MDLs (organized by product 
manufacturer), of which thousands had been filed directly in that court. 
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who will speak for the group; the lawyers have agreements about cost and fee 
sharing, and judges rely on the common benefit doctrine to award fees to pay 
lead lawyers (the Plaintiff Steering Committees or other primary counsel), 
who recoup the largest sums.187 In practice, individual litigants with tort or 
other claims have attenuated relationships (at best) with the lawyers dealing 
directly with the judges and adversaries in MDL litigations. 
Settlements are common in all the cases, and while formally individuals 
could exit, the costs of pursuit, whether opting out of classes or refusing MDL 
settlements, are high. Indeed, many settlements include “back door” or “walk 
away” provisions enabling defendants to exit if an insufficient number of 
claimants agree to be bound. Individual lawyers thus have complex duties to 
clients, and may believe that accepting settlements is the wisest or only 
plausible course.188 
In sum, both Mullane and Rule 23 altered the landscape of litigation by 
reconceptualizing the capacity of courts to generate decisions binding 
individuals—which is to say, changing the meaning of what constituted “due 
process” in courts. Yet the individualized model once seemed sufficient for 
personal injury cases, which in the early 1960s comprised almost forty percent 
of the federal courts’ dockets.189 Moreover, in the 1940s, even as judges 
understood the congressional mandate in the FLSA to help workers obtain 
countervailing power, they thought it unconstitutional for Congress to “force 
one to become a plaintiff against his will or without his consent, or to select 
for him an agent or attorney to represent him.”190 Today, reflecting the 
assumption of the legality of insisting on aggregate responses, we use phrases 
such as “the asbestos litigation” and the “vaginal mesh litigation,” and call 
without hesitation for congressional and executive efforts to shape global 
resolutions of the harms from asbestos, 9/11, and the BP oil spill. 
 
187 See generally Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk 
and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (1998); Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 
LA. L. REV. 371 (2014). 
188 Legal ethicists debate whether lawyers can agree to use their best efforts—including 
promising to withdraw—to ensure that their clients accept the global deals proffered in settlements. 
See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 909-10 (2016); Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical 
Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1943 (2017). 
189 See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, the Federal Courts Since the Good Old 
Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921, 936 (1988). 
190 Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 45 F. Supp. 986, 989 (1941). 
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V. REVISITING THE REGULATION OF CLASS ACTIONS AND MDL 
AGGREGATES TO CRAFT NEW RULES FOR REMEDIES 
As this account of the history, rules, and doctrine of aggregation makes 
plain, reforms have and should be motivated by problems in need of solutions. 
Proposals such as the 2017 anti-class action statute presume aggregation is itself 
the problem, producing too many litigants who lack meritorious substantive 
claims. My account offers a different analysis. The central elements of the 
contemporary federal court docket that I have identified demonstrate both the 
demand for and the contribution made by aggregation.191 
The Mullane Court directed us to shape procedures to respond to “vital” 
state interests. Like the social orders of which they are a part, courts today 
are haunted by inequalities among participations. The legitimacy of courts 
rests on making welcome all eligible rights-claimants and providing 
opportunities for decisions that are subject to public scrutiny. Courts are thus 
one venue of the democratic, in the sense of enabling iterative debates 
through offering disciplined opportunities for participation by those affected, 
oversight through third-party public rights of observation, and commitments 
to equitable distributions across sets of similarly-situated claimants.192 
Disagreements about the scope of legal rights and the function of remedies 
result through such public contestation. 
Detailing the need for aggregation should not be equated with an 
assumption that the current practices suffice. What fifty years have taught—and 
what needs acknowledgement through new rules and doctrine—is that aggregate 
litigation has three stages: initiation, resolution through a mix of litigation and 
negotiation, and provision of remedies. All the relevant information about 
implementation (either in terms of locating recipients, dealing with recalcitrant 
defendants, or deciding how to revise remedies in light of changing conditions) 
is not always available at the time of settlement. 
Judges have long described themselves as “fiduciaries” for absentees in class 
litigation,193 but courts have not generally taken that obligation past 
 
191 Data from state courts in ten major urban counties in 2012 underscore this point. 
Evaluations of more than 600,000 cases found that in about three-quarters, at least one of the civil 
litigants were unrepresented; reviewing more than 900,000 cases, less than four percent of the cases 
ended in a trial. See NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION 
IN STATE COURTS 14-16, 21, 33 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/
CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/Z5GB-6SAT]. 
192 See generally JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011); Judith 
Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 2 (2011).  
193 Judges often invoke that term when considering whether to approve class settlements. See, 
e.g., Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
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certification and settlement into the implementation phase. Nor have courts 
insisted on public mechanisms for dealing with conflicts that can emerge during 
distributions or documenting the actual impact of the remedies provided. Indeed, 
in some instances, such as in the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy, co-claimants were 
barred from learning what others had received.194 Elsewhere, I outline potential 
responses to these problems.195 My goal here has been to document the problems 
making aggregation central today. 
Federal rules and statutes need to enable aggregation because neither judges, 
litigants, nor the public fare well in a lawyer-less world, where economic 
disparities among disputants vitiate the potential for access to a fair process—or 
access to any process at all. What the current federal docket illustrates is that 
federal courts themselves benefit from class and aggregate proceedings. But the 
individuals affected and the public at large have too attenuated a relationship 
with the resulting remedies.196 Constitutional reinvention is again in order to 
enable, constrain, and legitimate the distributional decisions made. 
I have offered a seventy-year history to document the ambitions and 
imagination that resulted in Rule 23 and in MDLs. The federal docket facts 
make plain the collective dependency of courts and litigants on lawyers and 
aggregation, and hence the need again to reimagine what courts could and must 
provide. The forms to honor constitutional obligations of openness in courts, 
litigant involvement with processes determining their rights, accountability of 
judges, and equal treatment of litigants have only begun to be developed. 
 
 
 
194 A $2.3 billion settlement fund was established to compensate injuries from an intrauterine 
device; the Trust and Claims Resolution Facility did not disclose the range of specific awards made. 
See Vairo, supra note 166, at 655 n.136. 
195 See Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due, supra note 65. 
196 The result may well be disaffection, rather than affiliation and compliance. See generally 
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
